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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 990297-CA 
JASON RANDY BIGGS, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for criminal homicide, a 
first degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal 
pursuant to the pourover provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court clearly err in determining that the 
State had carried its burden of demonstrating that it struck the 
only minority member of the jury venire for reasons unrelated to 
his race? 
The trial court's finding that the State did not engage in 
purposeful racial discrimination presents a factual question. 
Accordingly, that determination will not be set aside unless it 
is clearly erroneous. State v. Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 
1 
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(Utah 1996)(citations omitted); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 
155 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). In order to show clear 
error, defendant must marshal all the evidence in support of the 
court's determination and then demonstrate that the evidence and 
all inferences that may fairly be drawn from that evidence are 
insufficient to support the trial court's finding. State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990). 
2. Does the record contain sufficient evidence to support 
the jury's verdict that defendant murdered Kenny Leiter? 
A criminal conviction will be reversed for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is "so inconclusive or so 
inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on 
other grounds. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987)). 
3. Should this Court consider for the first time on appeal 
defendant's unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct? 
No standard of review applies where an issue is unpreserved. 
4. Did the trial court err when, three days after the 
issuance of State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (1999), it imposed a 
gang enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 6-3-302.1? 
The trial court's "interpretation of the effect of a prior 
judicial decision, whether one of its own or one of another 
2 
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court" presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness, with 
no deference accorded the trial court. State v. Montoya, 887 
P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No specific provisions are necessary to the resolution of 
this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of criminal homicide, 
murder, for shooting Kenny Leiter on January 2, 1996 (R. 2-4). 
After a two-day trial, a jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 
277). Following a presentence evaluation, the trial court 
sentenced defendant to a minimum mandatory term in the Utah State 
Prison of nine years to life, including a gang enhancement. As 
an additional enhancement for the use of a firearm in the 
commission of the offense, the court imposed a consecutive term 
not to exceed five years (R. 311-12). The court also ordered 
restitution in the amount of $9288.01. This timely appeal 
followed (R. 313). The Utah Supreme Court subsequently poured 
the case over to this Court (R. 324). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At a 1995 New Year's Eve party in a condominium clubhouse in 
Murray, a young man associated with the West Side Piru Bloods 
stole a baggie of marijuana from an associate of the Inner City 
Crips (R. 328: 229, 236). Because the Bloods outnumbered the 
3 
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Crips, the Crips let the incident pass (Id. at 192). The Crips 
were angry, however, and within the next day or so, "pretty much 
everybody" learned about what had happened at the party (Id. at 
193) . 
On the evening of January 2, 1996, three young men 
associated with the Crips - defendant, Jody Carroll, and Trevor 
Symes - were driving near the condominium complex when they saw 
Kenny Leiter, the victim, and Lori Nelson, his girlfriend, 
walking towards a nearby convenience store (Id. at.64-66, 170, 
173). Trevor Symes believed that Leiter and Nelson, who both 
associated with the Bloods, had been at the New Year's Eve party 
and, accordingly, that "they" had stolen the marijuana (Id. at 
66, 135, 149, 173-75).x The three Crips decided to follow the 
couple and beat up Leiter (Id. at 67, 176). 
Kenny Leiter and Lori Nelson entered the convenience store 
(Id. at 66, 133). Meanwhile, Jody Carroll parked the car at a 
nearby fast food restaurant and removed a tire iron from the 
trunk of his vehicle (Id^ at 70, 178). With Carroll in the lead, 
the three Crips prepared to confront the couple who, having 
completed their shopping, were now returning home to the 
condominiums (Id. at 68-70, 134, 177). 
1
 The testimony of Symes implies that as an associate of 
the Bloods, Leiter would be accountable for the acts of his 
fellow associates, regardless of whether he personally took the 
marijuana. See R. 328: 173-75. 
4 
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Carroll approached Leiter and Nelson and asked for a 
cigarette (Id. at 71-72, 137, 210). They refused the request and 
kept walking (Id. at 137). He asked again. When they refused a 
second time, they turned and quickly realized something was amiss 
(Id. at 72-73, 138). Carroll began striking Leiter across the 
chest with the tire iron (IcL at 73-74, 139, 179) .2 In response, 
Leiter pulled out a knife (Id^ at 74, 138, 180, 203). Carroll 
then backed off and threw the tire iron at Leiter, hitting him in 
the chest (Id^ at 76-77, 106, 180-81). 
With his cohort now unarmed, defendant, armed with a .38 
caliber handgun, moved forward to join the fight. (Id. at 81-82, 
181). Leiter was standing still, poised, waiting (Id. at 84, 
112, 141). Either defendant or Carroll then stated, ''You're 
fucked now. We have a gat" (Id. at 140, 152, 181, 206). 
Jody Carroll testified that when he saw defendant's gun, he 
turned to walk away, leaving Leiter standing there, saying 
nothing. Carroll then heard the gun click several times. 
Looking back over his shoulder as the weapon finally fired, 
Carroll saw Leiter hit (Id. at 83, 86-87, 111-12). Trevor Symes 
testified that after he heard the gun click, he turned and ran 
The tire iron was variously described as a crowbar and as 
a device used "to jack the jack up" when preparing to change a 
tire (R. 328: 107). 
5 
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towards the car, and then heard the gun go off (Id. at 182) .3 
Defendant, Jody Carroll, and Trevor Symes, having all run 
from the scene of the shooting, met up again at the car and drove 
away (Id. at 89, 184-85).4 Trevor Symes testified that as they 
left, defendant exclaimed, "I blasted him. I don't know if I got 
him" (Id. at 185). Symes also testified that right after the 
shooting, they drove to a McDonald's where defendant's girlfriend 
was working. They discussed the shooting to the extent "that 
[defendant] was supposed to be with her for an alibi" (Id. at 
188). Jody Carroll testified that sometime later "defendant came 
to my house and said that the cops were looking for us. To keep 
my mouth shut, basically" (Id. at 124). 
Meanwhile, Kenny Leiter's companion, Lori Nelson, had heard 
the same clicks and the same shot that the Crips had heard. In 
addition, she heard "this loud howl [from Leiter] like he had 
been shot" (Id^ at 142). She, too, fled (IcL_ at 141-42). As she 
was fumbling with the entry code to the condominium complex, 
Leiter caught up with her. The door finally opened, and they 
3
 Jody Carroll struck a bargain with the police, exchanging 
his testimony in this case for a reduced felony charge (R. 328: 
96, 119-20). Trevor Symes, who also testified for the State, was 
interviewed by the police but not arrested for any crime in 
connection with this case (Id. at 209). 
4
 Within the next several, days, Carroll disposed of the 
gun, which defendant had stowed under the seat of Carroll's car 
(ISU at 91, 94-95, 114-15, 122, 184). 
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began running down the hallway. Leiter collapsed (Id. at 143, 
256). Lori Nelson testified, "He was just laying there with a 
lot of blood coming out of his mouth. . . . he just had a - -
like a scared or something look on his face with just tons of 
blood coming out of his mouth" (Id. at 143). 
Kenny Leiter died in the hallway where he fell. According 
to the medical examiner, he bled to death, the result of a bullet 
piercing his carotid artery (Id. 330, 335). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the State used one of its 
peremptory challenges to strike the only minority juror on the 
panel for racially-motivated reasons. The State, however, 
provided race-neutral reasons for its strike, and the trial court 
determined that the State did not strike the juror with any 
racially discriminatory intent. Consequently, to overturn the 
court's finding, defendant must marshal the evidence supporting 
the finding and then demonstrate that it is clearly erroneous. 
He has not done so. 
Second, defendant argues that the evidence of both his 
identity and his intent was insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. As to identity, defendant argues, in essence, that the 
jury believed the wrong witnesses. Credibility, however, is a 
matter left to the finder of fact and will not be revisited on 
appeal. As to intent, defendant pointed a loaded .38 caliber 
7 
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handgun at his victim in the midst of a physical fight and then 
pulled the trigger multiple times. The very nature of these acts 
supports the jury's determination that defendant committed the 
murder with the necessary intent. 
Third, defendant asserts a prosecutorial misconduct claim, 
unpreserved on the record. Moreover, the trial court refused to 
accede to defendant's attempt to supplement the record. Absent 
the contents of the supplementation, the issue has not been 
preserved for appellate review. 
Finally, defendant correctly asserts that the trial court 
imposed a gang enhancement in violation of the rule of law 
articulated in State v. Lopes, 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999), issued 
three days prior to defendant's sentencing. Consequently, while 
defendant's murder conviction should be affirmed, the gang 
enhancement conviction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT 
THE STATE CARRIED ITS BURDEN OF 
DEMONSTRATING THAT IT STRUCK THE 
ONLY MINORITY VENIREPERSON FOR 
REASONS UNRELATED TO HIS RACE 
Defendant asserts that his murder conviction should be 
reversed because the jury panel was tainted by racial bias. Br. 
of App. at 9. Specifically, he argues that the trial court 
8 
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denied a panoply of his state and federal constitutional rights 
when it determined that the State's peremptory challenge to 
remove the only minority juror from the venire was not racially 
motivated. Id. at 5, 9. As to the juror's ethnicity, the trial 
court observed only that the juror, Lance Masina, "did appear to 
me [to have] certain Pacific Islander characteristics" (R. 328: 
216) . 
At the outset, defendant has properly preserved but a single 
ground for his claim. That is, in the trial court, defendant 
grounded his substantive argument in the federal equal protection 
analysis set forth in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
While defendant mentioned other state and federal constitutional 
rights in passing, he never offered any legal analysis based upon 
those rights. Furthermore, the ruling of the trial court is 
clearly framed as a response to a Batson challenge. See R. 328: 
214-16 or addendum A. Because defendant only argued and the 
trial court only ruled upon a Batson challenge, that is the only 
proper subject for review now. State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 337 
n.4 (Utah 1991)(where defendant raised only Batson challenge in 
trial court, reviewing court addresses only federal equal 
protection issue); see also State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 
(Utah App. 1990)(grounds not argued or ruled upon in trial court 
will not be considered on appeal, absent showing of plain error 
or special circumstances)(citations omitted). 
9 
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A challenge premised on Batson is resolved by applying a 
three-part analysis: 
*Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the 
opponent of a peremptory challenge has made 
out a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination (step 1), the burden of 
production shifts to the proponent of the 
strike to come forward with a race-neutral 
explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral 
explanation is tendered, the trial court must -
then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of 
the strike has proved purposeful racial 
discrimination.' 
State v. Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah 1996)(quoting 
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995)(citations omitted)); 
accord State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II"). 
Typically, to establish the first step - a prima facie case 
of racial discrimination - defendant must demonstrate specific 
facts and circumstances in support of such a case. See Batson, 
476 U.S. at 97-98; accord Cantu II, 788 P.2d at 518 (citations 
omitted). However, "[w]here the proponent of the peremptory 
challenge fails to contest the sufficiency of the prima facie 
case at trial and merely provides a rebuttal explanation for the 
challenge, the issue of whether a prima facie case was 
established is waived." Higgenbotham, 917 P.2d at 547 (citing 
State v. Macial, 854 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 862 
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) and State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 777 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 317 (Utah 1991)). 
In this case, the prosecutor immediately rebutted the 
10 
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challenge by explaining his rationale for striking the juror, 
without first contesting the establishment of a prima facie case. 
See R. 328: 215 or addendum A. Accordingly, whether defendant, 
in fact, established a prima facie case is not relevant to the 
Batson analysis here because the matter has been waived. See 
Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at 547; accord State v. Merrill. 928 P.2d 
401, 403 (Utah App. 1996); Macial, 854 P.2d at 545. 
The Batson analysis, therefore, proceeds to step two, with 
the burden shifting to the State to provide a race-neutral 
explanation for its peremptory strike. Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at 
548. Notably, the explanation need not be "persuasive, or even 
plausible/' Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. "'At this [second] step 
of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the 
prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will 
be deemed race neutral.'" Id., 514 U.S. at 768 (quoting 
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (plurality opinion); id. 
at 374 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment)). 
In this case, the prosecutor offered the following 
explanation for the peremptory challenge: 
[T]he reason Mr. Masina was stricken by the 
State was his direct response to a question 
posed by the defense counsel of whether they 
knew anyone in jail. And Mr. Masina stated 
in the affirmative, that he did know people 
in jail. And based upon that response, that 
is the reason we moved to - we peremptory 
[sic] struck Mr. Masina. 
11 
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The other reason is we thought he was young 
and single. It had nothing to do with his 
race. 
R. 328: 215 or addendum A.5 
The prosecution thus offered three reasons for its 
peremptory challenge: because the juror knew persons who were 
incarcerated; because he was young; and because he was single. 
All of these reasons could apply to individuals of any race. See 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (determining that wearing beards and 
mustaches and having long, unkempt hair are race-neutral reasons 
for exercising peremptory strikes). Accordingly, because a 
discriminatory intent is not inherent in any of the preferred 
reasons, they are race-neutral. See Hiqqenbotham, 928 P.2d at 
548 (stating prosecutor's explanation for challenge is facially 
valid if it "does not demonstrate a discriminatory intent"). The 
analysis, then, progresses to step three.6 
Specifically, defense counsel requested of the court, 
"Could you also ask whether any of the prospective jurors have 
any friends or close relatives who might be incarcerated at this 
time?" The trial court then queried the jury panel: "At least 
the last word that you had, do any of you have any friends or 
close friends [sic] who are in custody somewhere?" R. 328: 33. 
The prosecutor peremptorily struck two of the four jurors who 
responded affirmatively. R. 103. 
6
 Defendant cites to these three factors, concluding from 
them that the prosecution failed to provide a race-neutral 
explanation for its peremptory strike. Br. of App. at 8. 
Nowhere, however, does defendant articulate how these factors 
demonstrate a racially discriminatory intent. Because defendant 
has failed to develop any legal analysis relevant to Batson's 
second step, this Court need not even consider his claim. State 
v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
12 
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In the final step of the Batson inquiry, "the trial court 
determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his 
burden of proving purposeful discrimination/' Purkett, 514 U.S. 
at 768; accord Hiaaenbotham, 917 P.2d at 548.7 In this case, the 
trial court, after listening to the prosecution's explanation for 
striking the juror, stated: 
I am persuaded, counsel, that the prosecution 
has sufficiently rebutted the notion that 
there - that they were out simply to strike 
minority panel members of the panel and that 
they have provided to me sufficient reason 
for having exercised the peremptory challenge 
that was wholly unrelated to Mr. Masina's at 
least claimed minority status. Therefore, 
your motion is denied. 
R. 328: 216 or addendum A. This ruling, in essence, constitutes 
a finding that the prosecutor did not strike the juror with any 
racially discriminatory intent. 
Once the trial court has made such a factual determination, 
it is accorded great deference. This is because 
*[in the typical peremptory challenge 
inquiry, the decisive question will be 
whether counsel's race-neutral explanation 
for a peremptory challenge should be 
believed. There will seldom be much evidence 
bearing on that issue, and the best evidence 
often will be the demeanor of the attorney 
who exercises the challenge.' 
State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah App. 1997)(quoting 
7
 Throughout the entire Batson analysis, "the ultimate 
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and 
never shifts from, the opponent of the strike." Purkett., 514 
U.S. at 768. 
13 
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Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991)(citations 
omitted)). 
In order to overturn the trial court's factual finding, a 
defendant must demonstrate clear error by marshaling all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then showing that the 
evidence, including all fair inferences that may be drawn from 
it, provides insufficient support. Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d at 548 
(citations omitted). In this case, however, defendant has failed 
to marshal the evidence. Consequently, for this reason alone, 
his claim may be rejected. Crackdown v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 
P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991). 
. Defendant asserts instead that the trial court committed 
reversible error by failing to enter necessary findings 
subsidiary to its ultimate determination. Indeed, he argues, the 
court was unable to make any such findings because the 
prosecutor's rationale for striking the juror was "a mere 
excuse." Br. of App. at 8-9. Defendant, however, wholly fails 
to articulate the basis for his conclusion that the prosecutor's 
articulated reasons were "a mere excuse" for striking the juror 
on racial grounds. 
What defendant seeks are additional findings, articulating 
that the prosecution's reasons were "(1) neutral, (2) related to 
the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) 
legitimate." Br. of App. at 8 (citing Hiqqenbotham, 917 P.2d at 
14 
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548 (quoting Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted))). 
While the record contains no such findings, their absence is not 
fatal to the conviction because the record contains competent 
evidence addressing the factors and supporting the trial court's 
central finding of no racial intent. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
789, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)(citing Farrell v. Turner, 482 P.2d 117, 
119 (1971)) . 
First, the reasons were neutral on their face, as has been 
explained. Second, defendant in this case was a young, single, 
gang-associated incarcerated male. The prosecution's articulated 
motivation to exclude a juror who was also young and single and 
had friends in custody is thus closely related to the particular 
case being tried. Notably, the prosecution also struck another 
young, single member of the venire, a woman whose daughter had 
been fathered by a gang member. See R. 103, R. 328: 29, 33. Two 
of the State's peremptory challenges were thus used to strike 
individuals whose lifestyles bore some resemblance to 
defendant's. Third, the reasons given were, on their face, clear 
and specific: age, marital status, and close association with 
persons in custody. And, fourth, the reasons were legitimate 
because they could apply to anyone, regardless of race. See 
Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769 (defining a "legitimate reason" as one 
"that does not deny equal protection"); accord Merrill. 928 P.2d 
at 404. 
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Consequently, because defendant has not carried his burden 
of persuasion, the trial court cannot be said to have committed 
clear error when it accepted as credible the prosecutor's 
explanation and denied defendant's challenge to the peremptory 
strike. 
POINT TWO ... 
THE STATE ADDUCED SUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE BOTH THAT * 
DEFENDANT WAS THE PERSON WHO SHOT 
KENNY LEITER AND THAT DEFENDANT HAD 
THE REQUISITE INTENT TO COMMIT 
MURDER 
Defendant argues that his conviction should be reversed 
because the evidence of both his identity and his intent to 
commit murder was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
Br. of App. at 10-13. At the outset, an appellate court's role 
in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence following a criminal 
conviction is a limited one. State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 
(Utah 1994). That is, a reviewing court will reverse a criminal 
conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the evidence is so 
lacking that "reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt'7 that defendant committed the crime. State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), superseded on other grounds. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). However, "[w]here there is any 
evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
it, from which findings of all the elements of the crime can be 
made beyond a reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we 
16 
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will sustain the verdict/' State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990). 
Defendant asserts two grounds for his insufficiency claim. 
First, he claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish 
that he was the person who shot Kenny Leiter. He argues that 
Jody Carroll and Trevor Symes were inherently unreliable 
witnesses, that Lori Nelson's testimony was both incomplete and 
factually incorrect, and that defendant's mother and her ex-
husband provided the jury with credible evidence that exonerated 
defendant. See Br. of App. at 11-12. 
The crux of defendant's argument - and its fatal flaw - is 
his contention that the jury believed the wrong witnesses. See 
Br. of App. at 11-12. The law is well-settled that 
"[d]eterminations of witness credibility are left to the jury. 
The jury is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of any 
witness's testimony." State v. Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citing State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1990)). And, 
[w]hen the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
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In this case, the jury did hear conflicting evidence from 
witnesses for the State and witnesses for defendant. The three 
eyewitnesses to the shooting, however, all testified either 
directly or implicitly that defendant was the person who shot 
Kenny Leiter. Jody Carroll testified that he saw defendant with 
a gun, heard the gun click several times, and then saw Kenny 
Leiter get hit (R. 328: 81-82, 85, 87). Trevor Symes testified 
that he saw defendant pull out a gun, heard him say to Kenny 
Leiter, "You're fucked now; I've got a gat", heard the gun click, 
and then heard a shot as he ran to the car (Id. at 181-82). 
Lori Nelson testified that a tall man was brandishing a long 
metal object when a shorter man approached, pointing a gun at 
Kenny Leiter and ultimately shooting him (Id. at 139-41, 152).8 
The jury apparently chose to believe these witnesses rather 
than defendant's central witness - his mother - and the other 
gang members whose testimony attempted to impeach Carroll and 
Symes. Nonetheless, however credible the testimony of 
defendant's central witness, it was not dispositive. Defendant's 
mother testified only that defendant was home watching the news 
8
 Jody Carroll testified that he was 6f2" or 6f3fl tall and 
was armed with a tire iron, and that defendant was significantly 
shorter, about 5'10" tall, and was armed with a handgun. R. 328: 
70, 75, 107, 123. Trevor Symes corroborated that Carroll was the 
individual with the tire iron. Id. at 178. 
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on television at 9:00 pm. R. 328: 278.8 The shooting, however, 
occurred just prior to 8:27 pm. Id. at 227. Where, as here, 
defendant's insufficiency claim "presumes that the jury was 
obligated to believe the evidence most favorable to defendant 
rather than that presented in opposition by the State/' the claim 
must necessarily fail. State v. Howell. 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 
1982). 
Second, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove 
that the shooter intended to kill or even harm his victim. See 
Br. of App. at 12. "Evidence of intent is generally supplied by 
evidence of the injury by which the victim died or of the act 
which caused the death. The inference is made that the natural 
consequences of that act were intended to occur." State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 790 (Utah 1991). 
Defendant focuses on the act of shooting, inferring that the 
failure of the gun to fire when defendant first pulled the 
trigger gives rise to a reasonable inference that the shooter 
"assumed the gun was unloaded" and was using it merely to 
"assault and frighten" Leiter. Br. of App. at 12. Such an 
inference is unpersuasive in light of the facts. If defendant 
had intended only to "assault and frighten" Leiter, he would have 
likely brandished the weapon, encouraging Leiter to believe that 
8
 Defendant's mother's ex-husband stipulated that his 
testimony would be the same as that of defendant's mother. R. 
328: 292. 
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it was loaded, rather than pulling the trigger and demonstrating 
that it was not. 
Further, defendant joined in the fight only after Jody 
Carroll had thrown his only weapon at Leiter, leaving Leiter 
armed with a knife and the Crips wholly unarmed. R. 328: 76-77, 
82, 180) . A reasonable inference is that defendant used the 
loaded .38 caliber handgun to regain the advantage the Crips lost 
when Carroll discarded his weapon. 
Of central significance, however, is the undisputed fact 
that defendant pointed the handgun towards Kenny Leiter in the " 
heat of a physical fight and pulled the trigger multiple times. 
R. 328: 85, 111, 141, 152, 181-82. The "natural consequence" of 
that act was Leiter's death, caused by a bullet entering at his 
left shoulder and piercing his carotid artery. R. 328: 329-30, 
335. The very nature of these acts supports the jury's 
determination that defendant committed the murder with the 
requisite intent. 
POINT THREE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT PRESERVE 
HIS PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM, 
IT IS WAIVED ON APPEAL 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor referred to defendant 
as a "wedo" or "light-skinned Mexican" during closing argument, 
thus engaging in prosecutorial misconduct and mandating reversal 
of his conviction for murder. Br. of App. at 13-14. This 
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argument, however, has not been properly preserved for appellate 
review. 
The law is well-settled that "in criminal cases in Utah • . 
. a contemporaneous objection or some form of specific 
preservation of claims of error must be made part of the trial 
court record before an appellate court will review such claim on 
appeal." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987).9 In 
this case, the trial record contains no evidence of preservation. 
Defendant thus relies for preservation of his argument on his 
Stipulation to Supplement the Record, which references an off-
the-record bench conference in which defendant purportedly asked 
for a curative instruction with respect to the prosecutor's 
remark. See addendum B. 
This document, however, does not preserve his claim. 
Defendant filed his Stipulation to Supplement the Record in this 
Court, just a few days prior to filing his opening appellate 
brief, which relied wholly on averments in the pending 
stipulation. The pleading, however, should have been filed in 
the district court. See Utah R. App. P. 11(h)("If any difference 
arises as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in 
the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled 
Plain error and exceptional circumstances constitute two 
exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g. State v. Archambeau, 
820 P.2d 920, 922 n. 4, 5 (Utah App. 1991). Neither have been 
asserted here. 
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by that court and the record made to conform to the truth" ) . To 
correct defendant's filing error, this Court remanded the case to 
the district court for the limited purpose of having the trial 
court consider and rule upon the stipulation. 
The district court held a hearing on defendant's motion and 
subsequently refused to accede to the stipulation, articulating 
its reasons in a comprehensive minute entry. See Minute Entry of 
9/13/99, unnumbered at top of appellate record, vol. II, or 
addendum C. Specifically, the trial court determined that 
"[n]either this Court nor the prosecutor have specific 
recollection of the side bar discussion referred to" and that the 
averments in the stipulation did not comport with the court's 
customary procedures in conducting trials. Id. 
Because the trial court rejected the stipulation, which was 
the only evidence of preservation, it cannot at this juncture 
serve to preserve defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim. 
The claim, therefore, is waived. Further, defendant does not 
claim plain error or exceptional circumstances. Consequently, it 
is not appropriate to reach the issue under either of those 
exceptions to the preservation requirement. State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995). 
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POINT FOUR 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IMPOSED 
A GANG ENHANCEMENT ON DEFENDANT'S 
SENTENCE; CONSEQUENTLY, THE CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL 
BY JURY ON THE GANG ENHANCEMENT 
CHARGE 
Three days prior to defendant's sentencing hearing, the Utah 
Supreme Court issued State v. Lopes. 980 P.2d 191 (Utah 1999). 
In that opinion, the court held that Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 
(1995), the "gang" enhancement or "group criminal activity7' 
statute, "creates a separate and new offense/' and that each 
element of that offense "must be found beyond a reasonable doubt 
by a jury, not the trial judge." Id. at 195. 
In this case, the jury found defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt of all the elements of criminal homicide, 
murder. R. 270. It did not make any determination of 
defendant's guilt under section 76-3-203.1. Rather, that 
determination was left to the trial court. See R. 288, 330: 15. 
According to Lopes, the judge thus improperly became the finder 
of fact, "expressly taking that power away from the jury." 
Lopez, 980 P.2d at 196. This was incorrect as a matter of law. 
Consequently, the gang enhancement here must be reversed, 
and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial on 
that charge. Defendant's jury conviction for murder, however, 
should remain undisturbed. See id., at 194-95 (reversed and 
remanded for new trial only on section 76-3-203.1 charge). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
first degree felony conviction for criminal homicide, murder, and 
reverse and remand for a new trial on the section 76-3-203.1 gang 
enhancement charge. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this {Q_ day of December, 1999. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
#*&- (L~ yii^V^^ 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to Samuel D. McVey, attorney for defendant, Kirton & 
McConkie, 1800 Eagle Gate Tower, 60 East South Temple, P.O. Box 
45120, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120, this JQ_ day of December, 
1999. 
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Addendum A 
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- Colloquy - 214 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, we are going 
to take a recess for you. Approximately ten minutes. 
Remember the admonition. 
I will discuss a matter of law with the 
lawyers here• 
The jury is now excused. 
(Jury out) 3:52 
THE COURT: The jury has now exited the 
courtroom. The defendant and counsel is present. 
I indicated to you, Mr. McVey, at one of our 
bench conferences that I would grant you an 
opportunity to make an objection on the record 
regarding a claim which preceded in which you 
perceived an inappropriate striking of the only 
minority juror on the panel. 
You may proceed. Lance Masina. 
MR. McVEY: Yes, Your Honor. 
Lance Masina, who was a prospective juror on 
the panel, was peremptorily stricken by the 
prosecution. 
My perception was that he was the only 
minority potential juror and appeared to have 
characteristics of a South Pacific Islander or similar 
characteristics and possibly some Hispanic 
characteristics. And based on that, we believe that 
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- Colloquy - 215 
we have a prima facia case for a 
error in violation of our client 
Batson v. Kentucky 
's 5th, 6th and 14th 
rights under -- the 14th Amendment right under the 
Federal Constitution and, also, 
under the State Constitution. 
THE COURT: All right, 1 
Do you wish to respond 
MR. ESQUEDA: If I may. 
I'm not sure Batson is 
defendant is not a minority. He 
THE COURT: Well, let's 
purposes of this discussion that 
corresponding clauses 
Mr. McVey. Thank you. 
, Mr. Esqueda? 
appropriate. The 
is a Caucasian. 
assume for the 
he is entitled to 
claim the cloak of minority status given the 
circumstances. 
MR. ESQUEDA: And even < assuming that is true, 
Your Honor, the reason Mr. Masina was stricken by the 
State was his direct response to 
the defense counsel of whether t] 
jail. And Mr. Masina stated in 
he did know people in jail. And 
a question posed by 
ley knew anyone in 
the affirmative, that 
based upon that 
response, that is the reason we moved to -- we 
peremptory struck Mr. Masina. 
The other reason is we thought he was young 
and single. It had nothing to do with his race. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I can Indicate on the jury list that 
Mr. Maslna was number ten and It did appear to me that 
he had certain Pacific Islander characteristics. I 
concur with your observations of that. 
I have no idea if anyone on the panel had a 
minority background. None appeared to have Hispanic 
or minority names, surnames. 
Let me inquire of you, Mr. McVey. Is your 
client in any fashion a minority? Part of a minority 
culture? 
MR. McVEY: He is not, Your Honor. But I 
don't believe Batson requires that. 
THE COURT: Maybe it doesn't. I am just 
establishing for the record that he is not Hispanic or 
in another minority. 
MR. McVEY: The other jurors looked very 
Caucasian in appearance, as well. 
THE COURT: I am persuaded, counsel, that the 
prosecution has sufficiently rebutted the notion that 
there -• that they were out simply to strike minority 
members of the panel and that they have provided to me 
sufficient reason for having exercised the peremptory 
challenge that was wholly unrelated to Mr. Maslna1s at 
least claimed minority status. 
Therefore, your motion is denied. 
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Samuel D. McVey (#4083) 
Randall C.Allen (#7455) 
KIRTON&McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
: STIPULATION TO SUPPLEMENT 
Plaintiff, : THE RECORD 
vs. : 
: Appeal No. 990297-8£C^ 
JASON RANDY BIGGS, : 
: Priority #2 
Defendant. : 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure, the parties hereby agree 
and stipulate to the language in the attached Exhibit A and it is thereby added as a supplement to 
the record on appeal. 
FILED 
AUG 1 3 1999 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED this i <_ day of 4x^i>s"T . 1999. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By. ,<Wn****jJCr&~C£ 
Samuel D. McVey 
Randall C. Allen 
Attorneys For Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
DATED this / ^ of j^uJJ- . 1999 
By ^L—S^^#t^Zr^s<C_ 
Carlos Esqueda, Esq. / 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Samuel D. McVey (#4083) 
Randall C. Allen (#7455) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
: SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
Plaintiff, : RECORD ON APPEAL 
vs. : 
: Appeal No. 990297-SC 
JASON RANDY BIGGS, : 
: Priority #2 
Defendant. : 
Immediately after the prosecution's closing argument, and before the defense closing 
argument, lead defense counsel Samuel McVey asked for a bench conference where he stated an 
objection that the prosecutor had argued a fact not in evidence. The Prosecutor argued: 
Who is this Mexican Guy? Take a look at the defendant. If he is wearing a hat and dark 
clothes, as Lori Nelson testifies, he probably looks Hispanic. He looks a little light in my 
community. They call them a wedo. That means he is a light skinned Mexican. 
Mr. McVey asked the judge for a curative instruction that the prosecutor's statement was not 
evidence and the jury should disregard it. The judge stated that he would simply wait and 
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instruct the jury later that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. There was no specific 
direction to disregard the prosecutor's statement. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 5 MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
Plaintiff(s) , : CASE NO. 981911378 FS 
vs. : Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
JASON RANDY BIGGS, : Date: September 13, 1999 
Defendant(s), : 
After review of the pleadings, the Court rules as 
follows: 
1. This Court is unable to accede to the stipulation to 
modify the record for the following reasons: 
a) Neither this Court nor the prosecutor have specific 
recollection of the side bar discussion referred to; 
b) The trial transcript reflects an off the record 
discussion at the request of defense counsel (TR 380) 
at the conclusion of the prosecutor's rebuttal 
argument only. This discussion, was at the moment the 
jury was to be released for deliberation. This Court 
would not have had any further opportunity to admonish 
the jury. It makes no sense, nor is it this Court's 
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procedure to *wait and instruct the jury later" at the 
moment they are released to consider their verdict. 
c) This Court frequently admonishes juries that comments 
of counsel are not evidence and indeed did so 
throughout this trial. It is uncharacteristic for this 
Court to have denied such a request. Moreover, this 
Court's trial notes do not reflect such a request. If 
there was an agreed to additional instruction, there 
would by practice be a note thereof. 
d) The proposed quote (TR 377) of the prosecutor is not 
complete and thus creates a misleading impression when 
taken out of context. 
Dated this 13th day of September, 199, 
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